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Editorial
Zimbabwe’s Independence in April 1980, achieved as it was by a 
remarkable combination of revolutionary and legal activity, created a 
special challenge to Zimbabwean lawyers. Particularly significant for legal 
scholars at the University of Zimbabwe was the dramatic transformation 
resulting from the fact that a whole body of ideas and perspectives, 
unacceptable, unpopular or actually unlawful under the colonial state, 
suddenly became ‘thinkable’ and available to thinking Zimbabweans. Of 
these ideas, Marxism and Marxism-Leninism were only the most dramatic 
example, though by virtue of the election to government of a Party which 
proclaimed as its ultimate objective the achievement of a socialist order 
through Marxism-Leninism, they became especially relevant.
This new order was characterised then, as it remains today, five years 
later, by the basic elements of intellectual stimulation — contradiction, 
compromise, urgent demands for change and powerful claims for the 
retention of the status quo. Nowhere is this more evident than in the law, 
both within and around Zimbabwe, wherein is expressed in varying degrees 
of clarity, the tensions and tentative solutions generated by the material, 
social, economic and political realities of this ferment.
Thus Zimbabwean legal scholars face an agenda demanding, at a 
minimum, the study and awareness of the legal dimensions of, on the one 
hand — the articulated democratic demands of a liberated majority for 
justice, health, education, housing, employment and an end to poverty 
and dependence; and on the other hand — the equally articulate (if less 
rhetorical) claims of a powerful minority (as the first priority) for the 
retention or the minimum transformation of the capitalist economy. The 
legal dynamics of this contradiction must be analysed and understood in 
the light shed by scholars using a wide variety of perspectives.
The task also demands a thorough knowledge of the substantive 
elements that make up Zimbabwe’s legal system. This must include a full 
awareness of the British-designed Lancaster House Constitution, replete 
with historic compromises, as well as of the inherited state machine, deeply 
. imbued through both statute law and judicial practice, with authoritarian 
values and techniques. It demands the urgent study and exposition of the 
dense body of Zimbabwean Customary Law. Nor can it avoid a basic 
knowledge of Roman-Dutch Law and its deeper Romanist foundations. 
These provide a potential pathway to the conceptual treasury of one of 
the oldest legal system and to a richness of Romanist ideas developed 
throughout the modern world in both socialist and capitalist states which 
share with us this tradition. The paucity of serious scholastic exploration 
of Roman Law during the colonial period may be explained by the 
overriding imperial cpnnection with the Anglo-Saxon Legal system. Such 
scholarship provides an avenue to a storehouse of knowledge and ideas, 
which Zimbabwean legal scholars may tread. A serious gap in our 
scholarship, perhaps understandable in the context of the final chauvinistic 
days of “ Rhodesia” , namely an awareness of the comparative experience
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and legal knowledge of post-colonial Africa, needs to be remedied so that 
insights from this source can be added to the others that we must use in 
our efforts to make sense, for ourselves and others, of Zimbabwean legal 
developments at this challenging stage.
The Zimbabwe Law Review is intended as an indispensible means of 
meeting the above challenges. Early in 1983 the Board of the Law 
Department decided to work towards its publication. It also saw the Review 
as an important part of the work to evolve a contemporary and more 
relevant curriculum for Zimbabwean legal education. Thus readers will 
notice the particular emphasis given in this first issue to matters relating 
to Family Law, including a contribution on the subject from Tanzania, 
which the editors saw as requiring particular attention, The Department 
is also conscious of the important role the Review should play in an 
ongoing legal debate involving the Bench, the Profession, the Goverment 
and academics. This was one of the roles of the Zimbabwe Law Journal 
founded in 1961 as the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Law Journal by Professor 
R H Christie. The Journal ceased publication at the end of 1982.
As presently conceived the Zimbabwe Law Review will provide a 
vehicle not only for academics but also for students whose work merits 
publication. As the present volume shows, the pages of the Review are 
also open to non-Zimbabwean contributors, especially those writing on 
matters relevant to Africa and the Third World. This volume also 
demonstrates the editors’ readiness to receive contributions from authors 
in Government and the profession, and we are particularly pleased to be 
able to publish here an article by the present Minister of Home Affairs. 
The Review will seek to encourage active debate on contemporary issues 
and thus the section entitled Dialogue seeks contributions on more 
immediate and controversial subjects in a style of presentation less rigorous 
than that required of other articles. It is hoped that the review of legal 
developments and the publication of relevant documentation will be a 
regular feature.
_ Thus the Review is seen as being launched in a new context, offering 
new opportunities and challenges to Zimbabwean and other legal writers, 
th e  objective is to respond with scholarship of the highest quality, 
regardless of its viewpoint. The Editors are conscious that by taking full 
advantage of this new intellectual freedom and opening the Review in this 
way to scholars from all ideologies they are making a fundamental break 
with the past. This however is not only consistent with the newly acquired 
academic freedom of the University of Zimbabwe, but also with the 
progressive order which is the national objective. Nor, it seems, will this 
new policy be inconsistent with the motto emblazoned on the facade of 
the Law Department: LEX EST ARS BONI ET AEQUI (THE LAW IS 
THE ART OF THE GOOD AND THE JUST)
Lastly we express the Department’s gratitude to the Ford Foundation for 
it!s assistance in the launching of the Review ; : ,
Editor in C h i e f ......................
Harare, 18th April, 1985.
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THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONAL LAWS : 
TANZANIA’S EXPERIENCE*
Z. L. Rev. ■Vol, 1 & 2 1983-84
B.A. R w e z a u r a **
1. INTRODUCTION
Tanzania’s endeavours to find an appropriate law of marriage and 
divorce began immediately after independence in 1961 when President 
Nyerere sanctioned the recording of the personal law of various 
communities throughout the country. In 1963 the codification team 
produced a comprehensive draft code which was applicable to the Bantu 
patrilineal groups. It was published that year as Government Notice No. 
279 of 1963.1
It may be recalled that during the early 1960s some other African 
states which had recently become-independent were actively involved in 
critically evaluating their legal systems which they had inherited from the 
previous colonial administration. At the Dar es Salaam Conference of 1963 
for example, a number of speakers argued for the unification of customary 
laws noting that such a step would lead towards national unification.2
While efforts to record customary law were going on, some countries 
such as Uganda and Kenya were at the same time evaluating their marriage 
laws and considering alternative legislation. In Uganda in 1965, the report 
of the Kalema Commission3 made a number of recommendations the 
most significant being the abolition of polygyny. These recommendations 
were not enacted into law, however, the document remains only of 
historical importance.
In Kenya, a commission headed by Mr Justice John F. Spry, then 
an able and experienced judge of the now defunct Court of Appeal for 
East Africa, published its report in 1968. The report was very detailed 
and included a draft bill which was intended to make legislative action 
a little easier if hot quicker.
As in Uganda, the Kenya draft bill has never been passed into law 
even though heated discussions in Parliament and elsewhere have been 
made.4
• '  This paper was originally prepared for and presented at a seminar jointly arranged by the 
Fundamental Rights and Personal Law Research Project, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, 
and the Department of La\y, University of Zimbabwe on January 25th, 1983. I would like to 
thank the organizers of the seminar and the relevant institutions for inviting me and for their 
hospitality during my stay at the University of Zimbabwe.
** LL.M. (Harvard), Ph.D (Warwick) Associate Professor of Law, University of Dar es Salaam 
See also Local.Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order,. 1963 Government Notice No 
436 of 1963.
2' See Proceedings of the African Conference on Local Courts and Customary' Law (1964)
3‘ The Report o f  the Kalema Commission on Marriage, Divorce and the Status o f  Women,
, 1965, Government Printer, Entebbe. For a discussion of the report see Morris, H.F.
: ‘ (1966) “ Uganda : Report of the Commissign on Marriage, Divorce and the Status of
Women” , Journal o f  African Law, Vol 10 No 1 p 3-7.
4 Kessam, F.M. “ Report of the Kenya Commission of Marriage and Divorce : A Critique”
. (1969) Vol 2 Eastern Africa Law Review pp. 179-210
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A year after the publication of the Spry Commission’s Report, 
Tanzania published its proposals on the uniform marriage and divorce. 
The proposals were debated for nearly two years by various interest groups 
and the public at large. In 1970 the proposals, now in form of a bill, were 
presented in Parliament and passed in 1971. The resulting legislation 
became known as the Law of Marriage Act 1971.5
What the foregoing account indicates is that after independence many 
African countries were.dissatisfied with the state of their personal laws and 
were anxious to make changes appropriate to their new goals and 
aspirations. Their colonial experience had convinced them that it was 
necessary to restructure their legal system and laws in order to remove 
various forms of discrimination which had risen from the way the colonial 
legal system functioned; There was also the desire to remove the chronic 
internal conflict of laws which was caused by the application of the variety 
of personal laws within the same jurisdiction.6
But the unanimity which was shown by many states concerning the 
need to restructure their systems and to unify their personal laws was not 
shown at the stage of implementation. Therefore, as noted already, various 
commissions were appointed and produced detailed reports which Continue 
to gather dust in the files of the relevant ministries.
Of the three East African states, only Tanzania was able to pass a 
new law of marriage and divorce in 1971 although Kenya managed to enact 
a new law of succession in 1972.7This step put Tanzania in a position not 
only of a pioneer but one of great responsibility of demonstrating the 
possibility of success with fundamental changes in the law to accord with 
post-independence aspirations of the people. One is bound to agree with 
Professor J.S. Read who noted that “ [t]he Tanzania experience of of 
enacting and applying this new system of personal law will clearly be 
watched with the greatest interest by other African states, most of which 
face similar problems” .8
In the next section I set out briefly the important matters raised in 
the Government Proposals on Uniform Law o f  Marriage and Divorce.
I examine these proposals in order to show the objects of the Government 
in proposing the changes in the law. This approach provided us with a 
starting point towards an evaluation of the working of the new law.
II Proposals on Uniform Law of Marriage and Divorce
As already noted the Government proposals on the uniform law of 
marriage and divorce were published in 1969. Members of the public and
5- Act No 5 of 1971 which came into force on May 1st, 1971
6- Sawyerr, G.F.A. “ Internal Conflicts of Laws in East Africa” , in Sawyerr, A. (Ed.) East 
African Law and Social Change, (Nairobi, 1967)
7* The Act became operative only in early 1980s and is now Chap. 160 of the Laws of Kenya 
(Eds.)
8' Read, J.S. “ A Milestone in the Integration of Personal Laws: the New Law of Marriage and 
Divorce in Tanzania” , (1972) Journal o f  African Law Vol 16 No 1 pp 19-39.
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religious organizations were encouraged to give their views on the 
proposals. Consisting of a total of thirty paragraphs, the White Paper 
can be divided into four main sections. These are;
i. Provisions aimed at giving women an equal voice in the 
marriage relationship and to give a husband and a wife a 
right to determine their marriage choices;
ii. Provisions intended to introduce parity between different 
forms of marriage recognized under the law;
iii. Provisions relating to procedure for contracting a marriage, 
and;
iv. Provisions introducing a uniform procedure for divorce, 
separation and other matrimonial relief.
The above sections are examined in detail below.
i. Equality in marriage
On the question of equality between spouses, the White Paper noted 
that under most of the existing marriage laws a woman was not given a 
right “ to decide anything in respect of her marriage” . For example, it 
was noted that in “ marriage contracted in accordance with the customary 
law rites, the girl’s consent to the choice of the husband is not necessary 
as long as her father or guardian gives his consent to the marriage” . In 
order to reduce the power of parents and to emphasize the voluntary nature 
of marriage it was proposed that all forms of marriage would be defined 
as a voluntary union between the concerned parties. The payment of 
bridewealth (lobolo) which was seen as an obstacle in the way of young 
people9 was to be declared not essential for the validity of marriage. A 
minimum marriage age was fixed by the law and it was proposed that where 
a boy and girl had attained the age of eighteen, they could contract a civil 
marriage without requiring parental consent.
According to the old colonial customary and certain religious laws, 
once married, the White Paper noted, “ the wife cannot divorce her 
husband even if he has committed serious matrimonial wrongs” . Yet the 
husband in some cases may divorce the Wife at will thereby causing untold 
suffering to her and the children.10
In the sphere of property relations between husband and wife the 
White Paper proposed to introduce a law which would permit a wife to 
own property separately from her husband and to retain the property she
had acquired before marriage. The wife had a right to be maintained by 
her husband as well as a duty to maintain him if he was incapable of 
maintaining the family by reason of bad health or other disability.
Z. L. Rev. Vol. 1 & 2 1983-84
9' Para 14
I0- Para 4.
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The White Paper recommended the new law to make it an offence 
for a man to beat his wife. On the question of the right of the husband 
to claim damages on account of the wife’s adultery, it was proposed to 
retain this right but in addition, to extend the same to the wife. The new 
law was to provide that a wife would have a right to recover damages from 
a woman with whom her husband committed adultery.
ii. Parity Between Different Forms o f  Marriage
Problems of unequal treatment of marriages under different legal 
regimes were a result of colonial law and policy which viewed Christian 
monogamous marriages as being superior to traditional and Islamic 
marriages. The latter were essentially polygynous. There was general 
disapproval of polygyny by British judges some of whom described an 
African marriage as a system of wife-purchase.11 Such m arital 
relationships were not accorded equal protection under the law and were 
considered inferior to the civil marriage which was monogamous. As 
pointed out by the White Paper “ a woman married in church or at a 
Registrar’s Office cannot give evidence against her husband, but a wife 
married under customary law or Islamic law is compelled to give evidence 
against her husband” .12This type of distinction was to be removed by the 
new law so that all married women could enjoy equal status.13
While it used to be possible under the old iaw for a man married under 
customary law to convert his marriage into a Christian monogamous 
marriage when- he has baptized, the reverse procedure was not allowed. 
Thus where such a man had two or more wives, he was compelled to select 
one wife and divorce all the others.
There was no similar provision for a man monogamously married to 
convert his marriage from monogamous to potentially polygynous and 
if he went through a customary law ceremony and married another wife 
before dissolving the first Christian marriage such person committed a 
crime of bigamy.
The new law was to do away with this distinction. It therefore 
recommended that if a man wanted to change the nature of his marriage, 
for instance, if a Christian wanted to marry a second wife, he could only 
do so after consulting his first wife and obtaining her consent.14 Such an 
agreement would be witnessed by a magistrate who had the duty to ensure
Rwezaura, Personal Laws in Tanzania
e.g. Hamilton C J in R  v Amkeyo  (1917) 7 E A L R 14 (Kenya)
l2- Para 21.
13* See also Spry's Report at pp 13-15.
l4* This proposal was later rejected by the Conference of Bishops and now S 11 (5) of the Law of 
Marriage Act* provides that a Christian marriage can only be converted if parties cease to be 
Christians. Section 11 (5) states: No marriage between two Christians which was celebrated in 
a church in Christian form may, for so long as both the parties continue to profess the 
Christian faith, be converted from monogamous to polgamous and the provisions of this 
section shall apply to any such marriage, not withstanding that the marriage was preceded or 
succeeded by a ceremony of marriage between the same parties in civil form or any other 
form.
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that such consent was freely and voluntarily given. Similar rights would 
be retained by spouses married polygynously but wishing to convert their 
marriage from customary form to a Christian or civil monogamous form 
by going through a ceremony. The White Paper proposed that parties could 
also agree at the time of contracting a civil marriage on whether their 
marriage was intended to be potentially polygynous or monogamous. In 
the former case the husband would be permitted to marry any number 
of additional wives without seeking the consent of the first wife.
iii. Uniform Procedures fo r  Contracting Marriage
Although the new law did not wish to interfere with the marriage rites 
of various religious groups, the White Paper suggested that it was to require 
the observance of a minimum set of procedures for contracting a marriage. 
First a centralized system of registration was to be created. The system 
would be manned by the Registrar General assisted by a number of 
officials. There would be established in every registration area a district 
registrar and as many assistants district registrars as the Minister considered 
necessary. Ministers of religion, Islamic Sheikhs and priests wishing to 
solemnize marriages among the followers of their faiths were to be licenced 
by the state before being allowed to solemnize marriages. The Area 
Commissioner, a state official in charge of the District, was also to be 
licensed as a marriage officer entitled to officiate at all civil ceremonies.
Anyone intending to contract a marriage was to be required to give 
twenty-one days’ notice to the Registrar unless exempted from doing so. 
The Registrar would then forward the particulars of the marriage to the 
Registrar-General. A couple wishing to contract a customary law marriage 
was expected to notify the person authorised by the Minister to solemnize 
such marriages. Such persons would include village and ward level 
government officials.
iv. Uniform Procedures fo r  Divorce
Perhaps one of the radical proposals was that no marriage would be 
dissolved except by a judicial decree pronounced by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. The proposals in effect abolished non-judicial divorce and 
required even parties married under Islamic law to obtain a court decree 
before their marriage could be validly terminated. As the White Paper 
argued, divorce has such far-reaching consequences, especially for children, 
that it was deemed necessary for the state to intervene in order to ensure 
that justice is done.
The new law was to require the establishment of Marriage Conciliation 
Boards in every ward, village and town throughout the country. Anyone 
wishing to petition for divorce would do so only after satisfying the court 
that he or she had tried to seek reconciliation and failed. Provisions for 
reconciliation were to apply to all people irrespective of their faith, race 
or ethnic origin.
Z. L. Rev. Vol. 1 & 2 1983-84
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Courts were to have concurrent original jurisdiction to hear 
matrimonial disputes and.appeals from primary courts were to go directly 
to the High Court. The new law was to abolish the matrimonial offence 
doctrine and a divorce court would henceforth order dissolution of 
marriage only if it was satisfied that the marriage had completely broken 
down and that the parties could not be expected to continue to live 
together.
In conclusion the White Paper stated that it was not the purpose of 
the proposed legislation “ to make serious incursions in the rights of the 
husband. The object of these proposals was to safeguard the interests of 
both the husband and the wife.” 15This was necessary in order to accord 
equal treatment to the wife who did not have the same rights and remedies 
in matrimonial matters as the husband under the colonial laws.
The new law was intended to promote respect and equality in the 
marriage and was therefore consistent with the goals and aspirations of 
the entire country. In the words of the White Paper, it was “ essential that 
the law should protect the rights of the wife so that she may bring up her 
children to be good citizens” .16
These proposals were enacted without substantial alteration and form 
a correct summary of the new law. I examine in the next part the Law 
of Marriage Act and its application in Tanzania.
III. The New Marriage and Divorce Law
In 1975 I began a five region study to find out the problems connected 
with the application of the new law. My, aim was to gather a general 
impression ot how the new law was working especially in the rural areas 
where over 95% of the population reside and where I expected to find 
difficulties mainly due to the fact that indigenous traditional law and 
practices would be more dominant there than, for example, in urban 
centres.
The methodology of my research combined case material and 
interviews. I consulted first local primary court records to see what kind 
of disputes were being brought, how they presented, how they were 
decided, whether there was an appeal, and finally who was the complainant 
- i.e., whether it was the wife or the husband.
Then I conducted interviews with lower courts’ personnel including 
magistrates, courts clerks and court assessors. Most of these interviews, 
which took place after I had read the case material, were intended to either 
confirm or dispel some of the impressions gathered through reading the 
cases.
Rwezaura, Personal Laws in Tanzania
15- Para 28.
l i - Ibid
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Finally I interviewed ward and village leaders whom I expected to 
be involved in the settlement of matrimonial disputes. These included 
members of the local Marriages Conciliation Boards, Chairmen of 
Arbitration Tribunals, Church and other religious leaders, and the ruling 
party leadership. I also talked to litigants and several other people. I present 
below in a summary form my findings.
i. Regional Discrepancies
On the question of what kind of disputes come to courts I found 
regional discrepancies. For example in Kagera Region where I started, I 
found that few women took their marital problems to official courts. There 
were few disputes concerning control of rights in children or refund of 
marriage payments after divorce. Similar findings were made in 
Kilimanjaro and Arusha regions.
On the other hand I found in Mwanza and Mara regions, a large 
number of disputes concerning children, refund of marriage payments, 
and divorce.
In Kagera and Kilimanjaro regions I found that most parents did not 
demand high marriage payments from their prospective sons-in-law and 
were more inclined to respect their daughters’s choice of spouse. In Mara 
region there were many disputes betweeri parents and children over issues 
of choice of spouses. Parents insisted on selecting prospective spouses for 
their children and demanded very high marriage payments.
I got the impression that in regions where marriage payments were 
high parents were more anxious to control the marriage choices of their 
daughters and tended for force them to marry older people who had 
enough livestock to give.
In the Mara region people were keen to register their marriages and 
to obtain certificates even if they had initially married without following 
the procedures laid out by the new law. In contrast, I found in Kagera 
region little interest among couples in registering their marriages except 
in cases where such marriages were solemnized in church in which case 
it was the licensed priest who was responsible for this. There was evidence 
that most customary marriages were not registered despite the high literacy 
level of the population in this area.
With regard to divorce, there was throughout the regions surveyed 
an effort by couples to seek informal conciliation before divorce. Family 
councils, relatives, church, government and party officials were all involved 
by parties in the settlement of disputes. Most complainants, however, were 
women. In the Mara and Mwanza regions, most couples divorced out of 
court even though this was contrary to the new law, but when they 
disagreed on the amount of marriage payments refundable they then had 
to come to court. Resort to state courts under these circumstances provided 
an ideal opportunity for courts to require parties to petition for divorce
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before their disputes could be heard. The favourite term used by the courts 
whenever such cases come before them is that parties in suing for refund 
or bridewealth before petitioning for divorce are in effect “ putting the 
cart before the horse” . For litigants the most important thing was not 
to obtain a court divorce but to secure the refund of bridewealth.
Again I found that many followers of the Islamic law continued to 
divorce their wives by pronouncing three talaks, without reference to the 
court as the law required them to do.
ir. The Role o f  Courts
Generally courts showed an inclination to decide in favour of wives 
in divorce matters. In particular they held that divorce could be pronounced 
before full refund of marriage payments. During the colonial times local 
courts did not have power to issue a divorce certificate unless the father 
of the divorced wife had made full refund of brideswealth.17 This rule 
had the effect of forcing women whose fathers were poor or dead to remain 
married even where life was intolerable. By permitting a divorce before 
refund, the courts have enabled women to free themselves from undesirable 
unions. It appeared to me that not all women are ready to take advantage 
of this new freedom. As for the potential beneficiaries of the refund, this 
new measure was considered to be an unwarranted intereference in the. 
customs and so-called traditions of the people.
Courts also appeared to support widows who wished to lead an 
independent existence after the death of their husbands. The new law 
provides that a marriage shall come to an end on the death of either spouse. 
However, some communities drawing from traditional law do not see death 
as necessarily ending a marriage. In pre-colonial times many widows did 
not choose to lead an independent life because the male domination of 
social and economic organisation of the time did not permit. On the death 
of husband a widow was inherited by one of the male relatives of the 
deceased husband. Today the system of such levirate unions is undergoing 
considerable change and the courts are currently helping to free women 
who do not wish to be inherited.18 Courts also hold that no claims for 
refund of marriage payment will be allowed by courts after the death of 
either spouse.
A similar stand has been taken by courts concerning the mother’s 
right to the custody of children when the marriage fails. Under traditional 
law all children born in wedlock belonged to the father and were his 
property. On divorce a wife was not expected to claim custodial rights 
in the child. Indeed one of the big dilemmas which faced mothers when 
their marriage experienced difficulties was to choose between tolerating 
an unhappy marriage and being separated from their children. Today,
Rwezaura, Personal Laws in Tanzania
17' See for example Rules 101 - 104 of G N No 279/63
Kirwen, M.C. African widows. (Maryknoll, New York, Orbis Books 1979); Rwezaura Social 
and Legal Change in Kuria Family Relations Unpublished Ph.D Thesis - University of 
Warwick, England (1982)
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courts applying the new law have rejected the traditional rule and in 
appropriate cases do grant custodial rights to mothers. As recently noted 
by Mr Justice Katiti, in the case of Siael Rwegasha v. Christian 
Rwegasha.19
“ the times when the father’s dictatorial powers over his 
children were recognized unquestionably, without regard to 
the interests of the children, have gone. It is a confirmed 
view that custody of children can no longer be equated with 
chattel ownership, where even the most unfit person would 
own chattel provided he has the purchasing power. In 
proceedings where custody or the upbringing of a minor is in 
question, the court in deciding that question must have 
regard to the welfare of the minor, or infant, as the first 
paramount consideration. The rights of parents whether 
under customary law or otherwise can be . . . weighed in 
light of the welfare of the said infant.”
The views of Katiti J have been fully endorsed by other judges on different 
occasions. If this trend continues it is most likely that the traditional rule 
which gave a father unquestioned rights in the child will be reduced in 
importance.20 21
Courts have also supported women when they claim division of 
matrimonial property after divorce. Here again traditional law does not 
provide for any division of assets and divorced husbands have been 
strongly opposed to claims by former wives for division of matrimonial 
assets. Section 14(1) of the Law of Marriages Act provides that:
“ The court shall have power, when granting or subsequent to 
the grant of a decree of separation or divorce, to order the 
division between the parties of any assets acquired by them 
during the marriage by their joint efforts or to order the sale 
of any assets and the division between the parties of the 
proceeds of sale.”
Using the authority derived from this section, courts have permited division 
of assets between couples on divorce. Yet looking at some court decisions 
one gets a clear picture that courts have been generally slow in recognising 
the domestic services of the wife as her contribution to the acquisition 
of family assets. In the case of Hamid Am ir v. Maimuna Amir21 the 
appellate court considered the meaning of “ joint-efforts” and concluded 
that the phrases did not include the ordinary house-work of a wife. In 
that case a wife petitioned for divorce and further claimed division of assets 
in the District court of Dar es Salaam. She was granted divorce and the
19 Mwanza High Court (PC) Matr. Civ App. No. 25/77
20' Rwezaura, B,A. “ Social Fatherhood at Crossroads: A Study of Changes in Child Law in 
Tanzania” , (1972) Vol 3 Eastern Africa Law Review pp 67-99; “ Review of African Widows’’ 
by Michael C. Kir wen in Journal o f  Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law  (1982) Vol 20 pp 143 
- 149
21- 1977 LRT n 55
Z. L. Rev, Vol. 1 & 2 1983-84
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court further ordered that two houses be transferred to the wife. There 
was an additional order that the husband pay to the wife a lump sum of 
T.shs. 10,000/= out of the total of T.sh 50,000/= which was deposited 
in the bank at the time. No evidence was given concerning the actual 
contribution of th$ wife except that she managed the household 
economically and had saved money for her husband. Patel, J, rejected 
this argument noting that to accept a wife’s services in the home as 
amounting to “joint efforts” would be stretching the meaning of the phrase 
“ joint efforts” too far.
In a more recent case of Zawaid Abdallah v Ibrahim IddP2 
Mapigano, J, considered a similar question and came to the conclusion 
that Section 114 of the Law of Marriage Act was not designed to help 
a married woman, who has no property or has failed to acquire any during 
her marriage, to secure a share in the family assets merely because of her 
duties as a house-keeper.
Despite this narrow interpretation given to the section peasant wives 
have on divorce continued to seek the help of courts to recover what they 
call “ compensation” and others have used a Swahili word “kiinua 
mgongo” which means a form of pension benefits. For example, in the 
case of Kaguri Mchuma v. Tantu Marwa23 a wife was granted a decree 
of divorce after which she claimed what she described as her “ kiinua 
mgongo” . The husband successfully opposed the claim on the ground that 
he could not pay or compensate her for having been a wife. In another 
case of Martha Robi Timotheo v. Augustion Kiningo24 a former wife of 
a shopkeeper filed a suit claiming what she described as a “ salary due 
to her as a former wife” . The primary court awarded her some T. shs. 
180 but on appeal the husband successfully argued that it was improper 
for the former wife to ask him to pay her a salary while she was formerly 
his wife and whatever services she had rendered were rendered in her 
capacity as a wife and not an employee.
These similar cases show that whereas wives have been forced by 
economic circumstances to recognise the value of their labour power, courts 
have been slow to grant such claims. Indeed the claims which these peasant 
women make reflect a change going on in the traditional social system. 
The changes have resulted from a steady erosion of the Kinship ideology 
which in precapitalist times was used to obscure property relations in these 
societies. Yet husbands and other elders continue to shelter behind 
“ traditional” and status relations hoping thereby to reap benefits from 
the new economic opportunities open to them. They deploy the labour 
power of their wives in the sphere of cashcrop farming, shopkeeping, etc., 
and in other forms of business. On divorce when their wives make claims 
for division of assets accumulated through this new economic involvement, 
husbands invoke tradition to defeat such claims. There is no doubt that 
one way in which courts can contribute to the promotion of human rights *23
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23- Mwanza High Court (P.C.) Civ. App. No 34/77
Tarime Primary Court Civ. Case No 130/68
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is to give more liberal interpretation to the provisions of Section 114 and 
the concept of “joint efforts” which it embodies. Courts should also grant 
to women maintenance after divorce without demanding the existence of 
“ special reasons” .25
Despite the caution shown by courts in applying certain provisions 
of the new law superior courts have demonstrated willingness to apply 
broadly the new law even where its provisions appear to be in conflict 
vith tradition. For some judges customary law has been likened to a 
“ reinless wild horse which only the expert horsemen can mount and 
control” .26 In many ways courts have encouraged parties who wish to 
break away from traditional control to do so while those wishing to adhere 
to ‘tradition’ have not been interferred with. For example, whereas courts 
have been prepared to recognise a marriage relationship where the husband 
has not given bridewealth they have at the same time entertained suits for 
payment and refund and have generally treated this aspect of marriage 
as a purely contractual obligation between the parties. Indeed it can be 
said that where the new law has not abolished the practice courts have 
tended to treat traditional obligations as private contractual duties which 
are not binding on parties unless specifically agreed upon. In other words, 
courts have been prepared to enforce such obligation when they are 
satisfied that all the parties have initially agreed to be so bound. The 
implications of this practice is that courts have permitted a practice 
whereby parties wishing to break away from- traditional constraints can 
do so while those who consider themselves bound by tradition have not 
been disturbed. Such judicial technique has been more noticeable at the 
level of superior courts while the primary courts have shown in some cases 
a tendency towards enforcing traditional obligations.
The problems which courts will have to face for some years to come 
is to decide when to apply rules of customary law and when to reject them 
on grounds that social and economic change have rendered them oppressive 
and inequitable. In the words of Mwakasendo J when will the wild reinless 
horse be put under control?
iii. ASSESSMENT
In a nutshell the five regional surveys revealed a number of matters 
concerning the operation of the new law of marriage and divorce. They 
include problems of substance, technical and administrative nature which 
arise in the application of the new legislation. Solutions to some of these 
would include the provision of better trained personnel, permitting greater 
access to registration facilities, publicising the law, etc.
The second problem concerns the extent to which the provisions of 
the new law and the push which courts are exerting will result in influencing 
social behaviour. This problem does not have an easy answer. For as we 
have seen some of the disputes between spouses do not arise merely because
2S- See Section 115 (1) of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971
26‘ Mbaruku v Chimonyogoro 1971 H C D n. 406, per Mwakasendo J
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there is a new law of marriage and divorce. They arise out of an ongoing 
complex context of social and economic relationships. The new law enters 
the scene to deal with such conflict and in some cases can prove an adequate 
tool for resolving them. Sometimes however parties can ignore the law 
and seek other means of resolving their disputes.27
As noted by Professor Moore,28 legislation “ consists of conscious 
attempts at social direction. But clearly societies are in the grip of processes 
of change quite outside this kind of control” ..In order for the law to be 
effective, it is necessary for the legislature to understand these “ processes 
of chaige” . The gap between the desired direction of social behaviour 
and that of ongoing social change must be grasped as well and efforts 
made to reduce it.
In Tanzania, as in most of Africa, the traditional order is in a state 
of rapid change. The beneficiaries of the old order who are mostly men 
and elders assert that tradition is immutable and must be respected while 
those persons who look into new order for individual autonomy in the 
social and economic fields assert their freedom from traditional obligations 
using the new law and state policy as their justification.
There is urgent need therefore for more empirical research at the 
grass-root level in order to assess more accurately the extent to which the 
integration of the traditional economic and social system into a world 
capitalist system has effected family relationships in Tanzania. My research 
among the Kuria of Tanzania from which I have drawn much insight 
indicates that the degree of change is greater than one is led to believe29 
One of the reasons why change is often obscured is that reference to kinship 
obligations and emphasis on other forms of social status relationships is 
often made by elders not so much to uphold tradition in high esteem but 
to attain certain social, economic and political advantages. The tug-of- 
war between elders and subordinates which is reflected in court decisions 
is part of an ongoing process of social conflict and change.
27' My research did not deal with the problem of what percentage of people use state courts to 
resolve their matrimonial conflicts. Experience shows however that the number is not large.
28- S. Moore, Law as Process: An anthropological approach (London Routledge, 1978).
29 ’ See Rwezaura, op. cit., note 18
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